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ABSTRACT:  Islands  have  transitioned  from  being  conceived  as  prototypes  of  idealised 
polities to being deliberately engineered as offshore enclaves where the rules of the parent state 
need not fully apply. With their manageable size, separation and distance from the mainland, 
small islands are rendered as convenient laboratories for entrepreneurial political engineering, 
and  equally  handy  sites  for  research  on  the  same.  Island  migration  policies  manifest  this 
contemporary  flexibility  and  creative  governance  of  states.  As  we  approach  the  500th 
anniversary of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), this paper explores these ideas in relation to the 
migration  phenomenon  on  Europe’s  southern  flank.  Using  an  island  studies  approach,  it 
discusses  the  problematique  of  island  spaces  caught  in  this  dynamic  but  which  cannot  be 
‘offshore’ because, as unitary island states (Cyprus and Malta) and unlike larger states with 
small outlying and peripheral island components (Italy and Australia), they must somehow be 
‘both inside and outside’. The paper goes on to critique such facile binarisms, arguing for a 
more nuanced appreciation of islands as well as a recognition that what may be, at face value, 
an expression of a state’s authority is as much a manifestation of its limitations.  
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Introduction  
 
The closest I have been to the status of a klandestin, was when I was mistaken for one. 
It must have been early 1997, and my wife Anna and I – both amateur astronomers in 
our spare time – left our house on foot one late evening, with our two young boys (aged 12 and 
6) in tow, to find a suitably dark site from where to observe Comet Hale Bopp, then visible to 
the naked eye. The location is Marsaskala, Malta, a seaside town enjoying uninterrupted views 
across the Mediterranean, towards the east. We trekked gingerly down to a rocky area where 
we expected pitch dark conditions: it was a cloudless, moonless night, and with no hint of a 
breeze. We found a place where to sit; and waited for our eyes to adjust to night vision. 
Suddenly, we heard footsteps, and coming from different directions. Two bright torches 
were flashed into our faces. A man’s voice asked very firmly, in Maltese: “X’qed tagħmlu?” 
(What are you up to?) I was too shaken to respond. Anna answered back, quite spontaneously: 
“X’qed tagħmlu inthom?” (What are you doing?). By then, the figures had crept closer, and we 
could make out their camouflaged army fatigues. I also believe they were armed. With a few 
glances, they had checked us out, and one of the soldiers reported to the others: “Dawn orrajt. 
Familja maltija” (These are OK.  It’s a Maltese family.) We explained what we four were G. Baldacchino 
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doing, all alone in the dark. Before the soldiers left us, they told us that they were looking for 
klandestini; they had been tipped that some had landed by boat in the vicinity. 
The encounter was not pleasant: we felt helpless and vulnerable to the soldiers and their 
authoritative practices; our eyes hurt with the sudden exposure to bright light; and at the same 
time, we felt relieved that we were ‘OK’ and could continue with our lives. But we were quite 
distraught and also felt insecure knowing that there may be actual klandestini in the area; we 
felt that the best thing to do was to head back home. The comet had to wait another day. 
This is an episode where the sharp end of a state’s regulatory and rudely dichotomous 
mechanism  connects  with  the  mobility  strategies  of  a  group  of  presumed  undocumented 
migrants. It also predisposes natives to be wary and vigilant of such ‘undesirables’. It is an 
encounter and a discourse that have repeated themselves, in various guises, on land as much as 
at sea, thousands of times; and with increasing sophistication, materiel and political panache of 
late, in the context of the drive for border securitization in the 21
st century (Bigo, 2008). 
 
This paper 
 
This paper serves as a synthesis to this special collection of papers; but it also advances an 
explicit  island  studies  perspective  to  irregular  maritime  migration.  It  explores  the  parallel 
historical transition of islands (at least in the Western tradition) as both special places for the 
blest  (engendering  the  notion  of  the  ideotypical  nation  state)  as  well  as  excised  spaces  of 
detention for a motley set of undesirables. Most states today could, in principle, deploy the 
latter to impact on migrants: but, in practice, such excising and extra territorialization has only 
been practised by the United States (in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba), in Australia (most notoriously 
on Christmas Island, but also subcontracted to other countries) and in Italy (on the islands of 
Lampedusa and Linosa). Cyprus and (more so) Malta, as self contained sovereign island states, 
have no hinterland to excise, even if they wanted to. Moreover, they have been subjected to a 
‘distalization’ of EU border policy (Mainwaring, 2012) possibly disproportionate to their size. 
In  this  way,  this  paper  shows  islands  to  be  not  just  convenient  microcosms  of  the  same 
phenomena writ large elsewhere; but liable to their own idiosyncratic dynamics, which are 
only naively reduced to binary oppositions. 
 
From endotopias ... 
 
Thomas More’s Utopia, an idealized jurisdiction of model government, had to be deliberately 
constructed  as  an  (almost  circular)  island  so  that its  geography  would  be  as  perfect  as  its 
political  principles.  In  this  way,  utopia  joined  other  island  spaces  that  were  engineered, 
materially or conceptually, in the Western mind to constitute mythical spaces of refuge, hope 
and civilization. From the sacred islands of Iona, Lindisfarne and Skellig Michael, to the fabled 
isles  of  St  Brendan,  Antillia  and  Hy  Brazil,  European  writers  and  then  cartographers  – 
historically or figuratively – used islands to preserve the Christian faith in times of extensive 
piracy and insecurity, to populate and provide beacons of safety and faith in uncharted Atlantic 
waters infested with demons and dragons, and to serve as physical and mental stepping stones 
in  the  timorous  voyages  across  the  unknown  (Gillis,  2004;  Johnson,  1994).  Such  texts  as 
Bordone’s isolario (1528), Porchacchi’s ‘island book’ (1572), and Coronelli’s isolario (1697) 
were atlases that presented an archipelagic concoction that comforted observers as much as 
navigators by offering refuge, supplies and repose ... much like the then prevalent concept of                             Islands and the offshoring possibilities and strategies of contemporary states 
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sanctuary on land (Gaudet, 2007). Moreover, the representation of islands as unified, bounded, 
naturally occurring cartographic entities presaged the idea of a similarly construed territorial 
state  (Steinberg,  2005).  Indeed,  in  the  early  modern  period,  islands  came  to  represent 
quintessential platforms for nation states: as delineated spaces, discrete bounded territories that 
are  at  once  knowable  and,  because  of  their  consolidated  form,  readily  defensible,  islands 
function as ideal embodiments of the state’s relationship to the nation (Peckham, 2003, p. 503).  
Perhaps more so than in continental states, island boundaries express and define the inside and 
outside of a nation as a distinct, compact and cohesive social entity. The finite and self evident 
island  geography  smoothens  the  nurturing  of  a  sense  of  identity  that  is  contiguous  with 
territory (Anckar, 2005; Baldacchino, 2005; Srebrnik, 2004). In their “physicality, visibility 
and regularity”, sea borders accentuate and colour the imagined tensions between the defensive 
and  offensive  functions  prescribed  by  the  boundary  (Law,  2005,  p.  267):  their  geography 
creates an ‘inside’ that is obviously distinct and marked off from the external world (Anderson, 
1991). Islands thus provide natural grounds for the construction of independent states (think 
Iceland, Singapore, Malta) as much as for aggressive expansionism (think Great Britain, Japan, 
Venice). Such tropes help explain why only ten populated islands are today divided between 
more than one country (Royle, 2001, pp. 150 2; Baldacchino, 2013); and where, even amongst 
these ten, expectations of unitary governance remain salient (think Cyprus, Ireland, Sri Lanka, 
Timor). In the awesome 21st century architectures of the Palm Jumeirah, Palm Jebel Ali, ‘The 
World’ and the Burj al Arab, off Dubai, we see examples of this pseudo manufacture of perfect 
island spaces, mock havens restricted for the exclusive use of the wealthy, keen to seek refuge 
in gated communities (Jackson & Della Dora, 2009; Junemo, 2004). And, in a less hubristic 
world, gripped by the impacts of anthropogenic climate change, ‘green islands’ like El Hierro 
(The Canaries, Spain) and Samsø (Denmark) offer tangible “geographies of hope” (Turner, 
2007).  This  world  is  an  endotopia,  constituted of  interiors:  made  up  of  sharply  delineated 
spaces meant to protect their residents, aligning geography with history and culture (Cameron, 
2012). The island here is a virtuous “enabling” space (Edmond & Smith, 2003, p. 8). 
 
... to exotopias 
 
And  yet, something else was happening, a series of policy measures that were positioning 
islands in a completely antithetical situation as outside spaces, turning the endotopia on its 
head. If a benign safe space befits and engenders the ideal state, then a maligned space is 
begotten by the strategically proactive state. We here venture into an archipelago of exotopia: 
now  protecting  those  off  the  island  from  its  transported,  undesirable  residents.  The  island 
becomes a dark, “disabling” space (Edmond & Smith, 2003, p. 8). Hence, a parallel history of 
excision and de territorialization: an exploitation of the smallness (hence manageability) and 
distancing (hence increased security) of island spaces to serve as sites of detention. The linkage 
of (often small) islands with prisons is an old one: pagans often located their demons offshore. 
Christianity locates its devils in Hell, which can be construed to be an island (Turner, 1993).  
Even in the magical Atlantic of the Middle Ages lurked the Isle of Demons (Johnson, 1994, 
Chapter 5). Dante Alighieri located his Inferno on an island in the Southern hemisphere. A 
graduated  spatialization  of  fear  has  led  to  islands  being  favoured  sites  for  xenotopias 
(Cameron,  2012):  penal  colonies,  or  even  as  wholesale  prisons:  Elba,  then  St  Helena, 
incarcerated Napoleon; Devil’s Island (in French Guiana) held, among many others, Alfred 
Dreyfus; Robben Island held Nelson Mandela; french political and religious detainees were G. Baldacchino 
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dumoed  at  the  Chateau  d’If,  outside  Marseilles;  and  Alcatraz  –  also  known  as  Hellcatraz 
(Gardner, 1939) – held Al Capone. Apart from the penal colony on/of the Australian continent 
proper in the 19
th century, several of its offshore islands served as higher security prisons: 
Sarah, Melville, Stradbroke, Norfolk, Rottnest, and the quasi island Tasman peninsula on Van 
Diemen’s Land (now Tasmania) (Gillis, 2007; Pearn & Carter, 1995; Royle, 2001, pp. 50 1). 
Like a macabre Matryoshka doll, a multiple insularity awaited the worst of the worst convicts. 
Meanwhile,  the  definition  of  those  to  be  detained  expanded  beyond  demons  and 
convicts: in 1423, Venice set up a lazaretto (quarantine station) on the island of Santa Maria di 
Nazareth near the city, and the Venetian system became a model for others to follow (Gensini, 
Yacoub,  &  Conti,  2004,  p.  259;  Sehdev,  2002).  This  zoning  practice,  another  type  of 
containment, codified at law, was meant to ensure that communicable diseases that might have 
been contracted elsewhere – by naval crews, passengers and animals – would not spread to 
local populations. The surrounding sea limited the possibility of escape, and thus widespread 
contagion.  Even  earlier,  an  enclosing  of  distinct  communities  in  ghettos  –  say,  Jewish  or 
Christian merchants in Muslim cities – permitted these some privileges (freedom of worship, 
tax  exemption)  counter balanced  by  restraint  (Abulafia,  2011,  p.  646).  Geographical 
convenience partly explains why many islands also ended up hosting, or becoming, hospitals 
that treated, as much as they enclosed, leprosy or contagious diseases (e.g. the “leper colony” 
of Molokai, Hawai’i, USA; and D’Arcy Island, off Vancouver Island, Canada (Holm, 2001).  
But this condition needs to be coupled by the ability of a state not just to exercise 
control over territory (via force or legislative authority) but to actively hive off one or more 
regulatory regimes within its own space. Excising, zoning, detaching, niching, outbordering, 
dislocating, insulating, unbundling, quarantining and offshoring are some of the performative 
active verbs that can describe a clutch of different initiatives which, while diverse, share one 
intent:  the  endowment  of  a  specific  place  within  a  state  with  particular  and  closely 
circumscribed privileges or penalties. These specialised services have led to various island 
detention camps and quarantine sites, but also, mainly in the 20th century, to offshore finance 
centres,  low tax  havens,  enterprise  processing  zones,  geostrategic  military  bases,  remote 
weapons  test  and  dump  sites,  special  autonomous  regions,  duty free  zones,  heritage  and 
conservation parks, spaces without right of abode, and various ‘mix and match’ combinations 
of the above. The physical and geographic boundedness and specificity of islands make these 
spaces both possible and appealing to their designers; they are often the default candidates of 
choice for such a thrust of political design that presupposes its own delineated distinctiveness. 
Simply and banally put, if one wishes to create or transform a place in order to endow it with 
the possibility of doing something exceptional, whether utopic or dystopic, and benefiting from 
both containment and distance, then that place should ideally be on an island, or be an island in 
toto. Meanwhile, the decisions to earmark such spaces in this manner would not be possible, 
feasible, or prudent if extended over a state’s total territory and population. As a perfect and 
unitary island space, More’s Utopia, while it is itself offshore to, and distinct from, its less 
idyllic mainland, cannot contemplate offshoring (Baldacchino, 2010). 
 
Three exceptional spaces, but not exceptions 
 
Sidaway (2007, p. 352) identifies a tendency on the part of modern day states to condone a 
progressively more variegated and zonal capitalism; a “complex and uneven experience of 
selective  boundary  crossings,  subjectivities  and  exclusions”  Such  an  “unbundling  of                             Islands and the offshoring possibilities and strategies of contemporary states 
  61
territoriality” enables a political system based on borders, sovereignty and territoriality to co 
exist with the “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1990; also Hudson, 2000, p. 276; Palan, 1998).  
Hence  we  inhabit  a  political  landscape  that  posits  both  inside  and  outside  spaces, 
leaving  considerable  room  for  “creative  governance”,  as  various  sub national  (and  mainly 
island) jurisdictions attest (Baldacchino, 2010). Spaces that are representative and performative 
of offshoring strategies – and located in a “sort of outside” (Harvey, 2003, p. 14) – cannot be 
regarded  as  “anomalies,  annoying  or  even  amusing  exceptions”  (Stevens,  1977,  p.  178). 
Echoing Georg Simmel’s concept of strangerhood, whereby a stranger both defines and defies 
boundaries, we are faced with an ambivalent yet increasingly common concurrence of spatial 
detachment and attachment (Simmel, 1971, pp. 143 149, also Bauman, 1997, p. 17). 
Expressions of such creative governance in relation to ‘undesirable immigrants’ were 
operationalised in the wake of the Tampa incident (Mares, 2002). On 26 August 2001, Tampa 
a Norwegian freighter, picked up 433 passengers and crew from the leaking Indonesian ferry 
KM Palapa and was later forced by asylum seekers (among those picked up) to head towards 
Christmas Island (a territory of Australia). Next day, the Howard government in Australia, 
supported by the Labour opposition, announced that Tampa would not be allowed to land in 
Australia or any other Australian territory. When, on 29 August, Tampa nevertheless entered 
Australian waters, special forces boarded the ship; its human cargo was eventually transferred 
to Nauru and New Zealand for ‘processing’. On 11 September, an Australian Federal Court 
judge pronounced that the asylum seekers should be brought to Australia, they having been 
held on the vessel “without lawful authority” and in breach of common law (Saunders, 2001). 
The full bench of the Federal Court, however, overturned this decision within a week (Federal 
Court  of  Australia,  2001;  Betts,  2001).  Following  this  incident,  the  Australian  legislature 
amended the Migration Act in order to limit the country’s obligations with respect to migrants: 
it designated over 4,800 portions of sovereign territory – including Christmas Island, Ashmore 
Reef, Cartier Islands and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands – as ‘non Australia’ for the strict purpose 
of  claiming  asylum  (Connell,  2006,  p.  55).  Moreover,  the  sovereign  states  of  Nauru  and 
Kiribati  were  designated  by  the  same  federal  act  as  “offshore  processing  centres”  (read: 
immigration detention facilities) for refugee claimants in Australia (Foster & Pobjoy, 2011).  
Moral and ethical issues apart, this so called ‘Pacific Solution’ illustrates at least two 
key lessons in creative jurisdictional praxis. First, is a process of state regulatory contraction: 
the manner in which a (typically large) country – in this case, Australia – can deliberately re 
engineer the identity of some of its component units in the interests of ‘national security’ via a 
process  of  selective  ‘de territorialization’  (Perera,  2007,  p.  203).  Spaces  that  are  already 
physically and psychologically offshore, and with sparse or no resident populations, are ideal 
candidates to be also rendered legally so. Second, is an oppositional process of state regulatory 
expansion:  other countries – in this case, the sovereign island states of Nauru and Kiribati, and 
eventually also Papua New Guinea – have taken on a set of tasks and services for Australia, 
another  state,  in  exchange  for  payment.  This  suggests  the  status  of  a  feudal  fiefdom  or  a 
‘tributary state’, and not of a modern sovereign entity. The onshore space of one sovereign 
country becomes, perversely, the offshore space of/for a totally different one. 
The idea for the legal creation of ‘non Australia’ probably came from the example of 
another jurisdictional exclave located on an island state, today with a notorious reputation: in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, refugee claimants (mainly from Haiti, but also from Cuba itself) 
held at Guantánamo Bay were denied any rights to appeal for asylum on the grounds that they 
were in a “lawless enclave” outside US jurisdiction (Kaplan, 2005, p. 839; McBride, 1999). G. Baldacchino 
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Guantánamo Bay has effectively been crafted and described as a “juridical limbo”, a “black 
hole”, “zone of indetermination” and a “carefully constructed legal absence”; it is a threshold 
where the border between inside and outside is deliberately ambiguous and uncertain (Bigo, 
2007, pp. 17 18; Fletcher, 2004; Reid Henry, 2007, p. 630). 
If Guantánamo Bay was the inspiration to Australia’s excised archipelago, then it is 
likely that the Australian case inspired Italy with regard to Lampedusa. The southernmost point 
of Italy, this small island (land area: 20 km
2), lies 205 km from the island region of Sicily (of 
which it forms part administratively) but only113 km from Tunisia. It is now best known as a 
key entry point to Europe for immigrants (rendered irregular) from Africa, as well as escapees 
from  the  turmoil  of  regime  change  in  Tunisia  and  Libya.  Thousands  have  attempted  the 
dangerous Mediterranean crossing; survivors picked up by the Italian coast guard were placed 
in a detention centre on Lampedusa prior to being transferred elsewhere in Italy for processing. 
In 2008, Italy ranked as the fourth highest asylum host country in the industrialised world, 
trailing  only  the  US,  Canada  and  France  (UNHCR,  2008,  p.  6).  In  August  of  that  year, 
however,  Italian  Prime  Minister  Berlusconi  stopped  this  practice  by  externalising  Italy’s 
borders to Libya “in the same way that Australia is externalizing our border to Indonesia” 
(Curr,  2009).  Following  a  US$5 billion  deal  with  the  Gaddafi  government  in  Libya,  the 
international waters between the two countries were more vigorously policed by joint naval 
patrols;  many  immigrants  rescued  at  sea  were  returned  to  Libya,  contrary  to  international 
refugee rights. The UNHCR (2009) expressed “deep concern” about this practice, as with the 
state  of  detention  facilities  on  Lampedusa.  The  number  of  migrants  attempting  the 
Mediterranean voyage fell dramatically since the Italy Libya pact came into force (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009), increased again with the ‘Arab Spring’ and the collapse of the Gaddafi 
regime (2011), and has allegedly fallen again since: new governments in Tunisia and Libya 
have signed agreements with Italy “to help keep migrant traffic down” (Thornburgh, 2012). 
 
Lampedusa stands as a blight on Europe: an outpost of the EU where normal rules do 
not apply. Increasingly, governments around the world appear to be adopting an ‘out of 
sight,  out  of  mind’  approach  to  these  kinds  of  outposts:  whether  in  the  Australian 
desert,  a  military  base  on  Cuba  or  small  islands  across  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
(Messineo, 2005). 
 
These three deliberately excepted island spaces are not alone: today we have places which are 
both inside and outside the law, designed to isolate, contain and punish. Asylum seekers are 
some of their key intended targets (Kumar Rajaram, 2007). Such a technology of excision 
produces “spaces of exception”: that manifest partial yet legalised lawlessness, via the very 
same exercise of sovereignty (Agamben, 2005). In the present imperial and neoliberal moment, 
where states are obliged to remove many barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, and 
who often find themselves looking helplessly at the free movement of capital and finance, 
states will exercise discretion on the free movement of people: we ought thus to expect more 
Guantánamo Bays, not fewer (Butler, 2002). 
 
But: life is less neat than binaries suggest 
 
Yet, island life cannot, and should not, be reduced to simple, and simplistic, binaries: of inside 
and  outside,  of  us  and  them,  of  paradises  and  prisons,  of  routes  and  roots,  of  stasis  and                             Islands and the offshoring possibilities and strategies of contemporary states 
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mobility. And especially so in dealing with a subject as irregular migration. Small they may be, 
and  convenient  laboratories  they  may  be  as  well;  but  islands  are  not  one dimensional 
caricatures of larger spaces. We are, after all, dealing particularly with multiple categories of 
irregular migrants, who can be processed in a variety of different ways, including those that 
bestow more or less mobility; we are dealing with islands that are outposts, borderlands, hubs 
of circulation and places of settlement, possibly to different migrants; but also to the same 
migrants at different points in time (Triandafyllidou, 2014; Bernardie Tahir & Schmoll, 2014); 
we are also dealing with barriers, frontiers and prisons where – like all guarded spaces – there 
are gates, doors, windows and other escape routes. Practise power as discipline, reminds us 
Foucault  (an  inspiration  to  various  papers  in  this collection)  and  we  invariably  experience 
resistance;  this  is  no  ontological  opposition.  Malta  may  have  intercepted  some  19,000 
klandestini over the past decade; but only 5,000 remain; some have ‘disappeared’, slipped 
through the cracks of the sentinel island to continue their life in continental Europe, perhaps? 
Pace  Loyd  and  Mountz  (2014),  and  without  diminishing  the  tragic  sense  of  loss  that  this 
involves, disappearance is not just a consequence of death by drowning. Such a permeability 
and porosity inherent to total institutions – and to which states are loathe to admit – allows us 
to combine and meld the overall (and itself binary) architecture that has driven this special 
collection:  that  of  islands  as  objects  of  distalization  (Mainwaring,  2012),  policing  and 
bordering; as much as translocal and interstitial spaces (Bernardie Tahir & Schmoll, 2014). 
 
The particular predicament of Cyprus and Malta 
 
In the Mediterranean, the three larger EU member states that are targets of migration – Spain, 
France and Greece – could (like Italy and its Lampedusa) excise part of their, especially island, 
territories – such as the Canaries, the Balearics and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), 
Corsica (France), and various Aegean islands close to the Turkish mainland (Greece) – to deny 
immigrants landed there from the right to demand refugee status. That these countries have not 
done so (yet) – opting instead to use ‘onshore’ facilities, like international airports, for the 
practice of more standard excision policies (Moseley, 1999) – suggests that they are not under 
extreme  duress  to  stop  the  influx  of  immigrants,  or  they  may  still  wish  to  uphold  their 
obligations at international law and refrain from earning the rebuke of civil rights groups.  
But: two other countries can only transit migrants in very limited numbers and would 
find  it  difficult  to  practise  excision,  even  if  they  wanted  to.  These  are  Malta  and  Cyprus. 
Unlike all the other EU member states involved as destinations for clandestine migration, both 
Malta and Cyprus lack those jurisdictional geographies that   at least officially   would permit 
them  (like  the  Canaries,  Corsica,  Sicily  or  Lesbos)  to  act  as  stepping  stones,  “interstitial 
spaces” (López Sala & Sánchez, 2010, p. 78) through which migrants arrive but also sooner 
(rather than later) depart to other (mainland) parts of the same state. Nor do these countries 
have the material physicality to practise excision: Cyprus is a single island (though internally 
highly fractured) state; while Malta, though an archipelago, is a compact island group where 
distances between the three main islands are not prohibitive enough to prevent ‘escape’, or to 
render any excised activities ‘out of the public eye’. While there is one main island (also called 
Malta), the remaining two (Gozo and Comino) are not offshore enough. 
Other  issues  impact  exclusively  on  compact  island  states  and  their  experience  of 
immigration.  Since  they  have  absolutely  no  land  borders,  the  first  contact  of  clandestine 
immigrants with Malta and Cyprus is generally at sea (no pun intended): often in international G. Baldacchino 
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waters far away from the immigrants’ port of departure. This means that the Cypriot or Maltese 
maritime units are less able to oblige such immigrants to turn back and head back to where 
they started their sea journey. Rather, their encounter is typically one of ‘rescue’, of providing 
food, water, emergency medical supplies and treatment from dehydration and disease. Such 
care beyond immediate first aid typically involves landing because it may need to be continued 
at proper, land based, medical facilities. The engagement of Maltese and Cypriot maritime 
units with clandestine immigrants is therefore essentially more of a basic humanitarian one at 
that point. In contrast, processing at a land border post carries the distinct and viable option of 
refused  entry  to  the  applicant  and  turning  him/her  back,  with  often  no  such  serious 
repercussions on his/her immediate health and survival. Moreover, once landed in Cyprus or 
Malta,  there  is  no  hinterland  to  which  irregular  immigrants  can  be  despatched:  both  these 
countries (and Malta more so) have – as their politicians are likely to remind us – limited land 
areas and relatively high population densities; though they still do their best to locate their 
detention camps out of the public eye. This situation further reduces the room for manoeuvre 
available  to  the  Cypriot  and  Maltese  authorities  in  the  face  of  irregular  immigration.  No 
wonder  then  that  Cyprus  and  Malta  disagree  with  the  basic  provisions  of  the  Dublin  II 
agreement whereby an irregular migrant’s application for asylum is to be handled by the EU 
member state where that migrant first arrived.  While meant to prevent ‘asylum shopping’, 
(migrants  seeking  asylum  in  different  countries  at  the  same  time),  these  regulations  have 
allegedly created a lopsided burden on border countries, and especially Malta (Sansone, 2011). 
There  is  another  interesting  twist  to  the  irregular  migrant  story:  the  increase  of 
nationalist sentiment in both Malta and Cyprus. Former British colonies, both island states 
sought integration with a larger metropolitan state before securing independence: Malta sought 
integration with a reluctant Britain, while Greek Cypriots sought enosis (union) with Greece 
(even as Turkish Cypriots sought a two state division [taksim] as the best guarantee for their 
civil rights). Such historical events belie an absent sense of local nationalism, perhaps even 
evidence that these may be “nationless states” (Baldacchino, 2002, on Malta), lacking unifying 
symbols that cut across racial, ethnic or partisan solitudes. The arrival of often dark skinned, 
often non Christian, irregular immigrants has triggered an appeal to, and a nostalgia for, a 
mythical depiction of nationhood in both island states: one premised on the national character 
as  solidly  white skinned,  racially  pure,  European  and  Christian  (Catholic  in  Malta;  Greek 
Orthodox in Cyprus), and with the converse distrust and fear of the ‘Other’ (Baldacchino, 
2009). Hence a xenophobic culturescape unfolds: an exoscape riddled with negative affect, a 
suspicion or outright dislike of the stranger; even though such dynamics are not borne out by a 
long history of Mediterranean exchange (Braudel, 1972). We must remember that only recent 
laws and regulations have created classes of legal, illegal or irregular migrants, in a maritime 
region that has ironically thrived for centuries (prior to the emergence of the modern, security 
bedevilled state) from open trade and movement (Abulafia, 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Just like More’s Utopia, Malta and Cyprus, it seems, can only be endoscapes: they serve as 
interiors (as sovereign states and as constituents of the European Union to both their own 
citizens and immigrants). While as states they could both flex their jurisdictional capacities in 
an offshoring manner, they both lack the geophysical materiality to be able to do so effectively. 
Yet,  ironically  enough,  the  tenets  of  the  Dublin  II  agreement  allow  the  EU  to  exploit  its                             Islands and the offshoring possibilities and strategies of contemporary states 
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southern border states (including, but not only, Cyprus and Malta) as quasi excised zones, 
obliging  them  to  keep  the  many  undocumented  migrants  crossing  into Europe  from  North 
Africa and the Middle East who are aspiring for asylum status stuck in their home territory. 
And yet, only for Malta and Cyprus, very limited off island migration is officially possible. 
Returning to Cameron: “... the myth of national sovereignty that we all live with is 
grounded in an island derived, utopic notion of selective openness closure” (2012, p. 743). 
While national sovereignty presupposes a world of equal players respectful of each others’ 
status and territorial rights, there remains lots of room for manoeuvre, a resort to selectivity as 
to the extent to which a state is closed/open, for whom, and for what purpose. The idea is 
similar to that of Foucault’s notion of governmentality whereby states, no longer concerned as 
much  these  days  with  threats  to  their  very  existence,  can  flex  their  clout  intra  and  extra 
territorially,  and  in  so  doing  provide  new  and  creative  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of 
sovereignty (Foucault, 1991, p. 93; Kuehls, 1996, p. 67; Baldacchino, 2012); a performative 
act of government as agency. In these, often post colonial “sovereignty games” (Adler Nissen 
& Gad, 2013), notions of race, nationhood and ethnicity are important constructs; and migrants 
unwittingly serve as the heterotopia to unfold these constructs in suggestive ways.  
And yet, all power leaks: nor does one play the game according to the same rules, or 
even  play  the  same  game.  Migrants  exercise  mobility  in  ways  central  to  the  unfolding  of 
sovereignty (Loyd  & Mountz, 2014): if my  family and  I have been deemed  “OK” by the 
patrolling Maltese soldiers back in 1997, then others were “not OK”, and would engage the 
state bureaucracy in specific rituals (Falzon, 2010) if caught. Migrant mobilities and practices, 
like their identities, are messy and complex; they include consent and compliance, and voice 
and exit strategies. In all this, the symbolic “small island’ serves as a manageable research site, 
a transitional space of flows, a carceral coffer at various scales, a sovereign state with reduced 
policy options, but still a deeply ambiguous entity with its own sui generis terraqueousness.  
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